

**Article Title****Election Oversight Strategy by the Maros Regency Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu) in Addressing Election Crimes****Author (s)****Ahmad Muhajir**

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## ABSTRACT

This study analyzes election oversight strategies implemented by the Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu) of Maros Regency in addressing election crimes following Constitutional Court Decision No. 135/PUU-XXII/2024, which promotes the integration of regional legislative elections with regional head elections. This redesign expands the scope of supervision, compresses electoral stages, and intensifies local political competition, thereby increasing the risks of vote-buying, mobilization of civil servants, and administrative manipulation. The study employs a non-doctrinal (empirical) legal research method with a socio-legal approach, using in-depth interviews with 30 informants (Bawaslu officials, sub-district supervisors/Panwascam, and polling station supervisors) and a literature review. The findings show that the oversight strategy is built through preventive measures based on multi-channel outreach and target segmentation, vulnerability mapping and risk-based patrols, continuous supervision throughout all electoral stages down to polling stations, and early enforcement through the Integrated Law Enforcement Center (Sentra Gakkumdu). While these strategies are relatively effective in reducing overt violations and strengthening tiered coordination, they remain constrained by limited human resources and facilities, a permissive culture toward vote-buying, local socio-political pressures, and weak initial evidence and delayed reporting that hinder case escalation to prosecution. These findings underscore the need to strengthen supervisory capacity, enhance public legal literacy, protect whistleblowers and witnesses, and optimize oversight technologies to ensure more effective and sustainable enforcement of election criminal law.

**Keywords:** Election Supervision; Bawaslu of Maros Regency; Election Crimes; Sentra Gakkumdu; Vote-Buying

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## INTRODUCTION

Developments in Indonesia's electoral regulations have once again undergone fundamental dynamics following the issuance of **Constitutional Court Decision Number 135/PUU-XXII/2024**. This decision signifies an important shift in the construction of the national electoral legal framework, particularly in relation to the administration of regional legislative elections and regional head elections (Darmawan, 2025). The Constitutional Court stated that elections for members of the Provincial DPRD and Regency/Municipal DPRD may be held concurrently with the elections of governors, regents, and mayors. This provision alters the previous electoral arrangement, which separated elections into two different statutory regimes (Gunawan, & Mujahidah, 2024).

The Constitutional Court decision carries structural juridical consequences. The resulting changes are not merely technical in terms of scheduling, but also affect the overall design of the electoral system (Arifin & No, 2025). The legal framework previously established through **Law Number 7 of 2017 on General Elections** and legislation governing regional head elections has become directly intertwined within a single electoral cycle (Sujoko & Haboddin, 2020). This situation demands serious adjustments in regulatory aspects, the institutional readiness of election organizers, and electoral oversight mechanisms.

From a theoretical perspective, changes in electoral design form part of the concept of **constitutional engineering**. This concept views the electoral system as a constitutional instrument that can be redesigned to achieve certain democratic objectives (Putri, Laia & Laia, 2023). The principles of governmental efficiency, political stability, and democratic effectiveness serve as the primary foundations for redesigning electoral systems. Electoral design is understood as a means of shaping balanced power relations between political institutions at the national and regional levels (Huda, 2017).

In its legal reasoning, the Constitutional Court emphasized that synchronizing the timing of regional legislative elections with regional head elections aims to improve electoral efficiency (Aermadepa, *et al*, 2024). The synchronization of terms of office between regional executives and legislatures is considered capable of strengthening regional governance. The long-standing mismatch of terms has been viewed as potentially disrupting policy stability and the effectiveness of the presidential system at the local level. The decision is positioned as a normative solution to the fragmentation of regional political cycles (Al Basith, Alhakim & Khatimah, 2025).

The reality of constitutional practice shows that the decision has triggered broad public debate. Critical responses have come from political parties, academics, and election observers. Redesigning the electoral system through judicial review is considered to raise issues of legal certainty. Judicial mechanisms are viewed as providing less space for political planning and consolidation than formal legislative processes.

The issuance of Constitutional Court Decision Number 135/PUU-XXII/2024 in the midst of ongoing election and regional election stages further increases complexity. The fundamental redesign of the electoral system is considered likely to disrupt the preparedness of election organizers. Technical planning, logistics, and the management of electoral stages face new and substantial challenges. This condition raises concerns regarding the stability and consistency of election administration.

Criticism also emerges from the perspective of local political vulnerability. The unification of DPRD elections with regional head elections increases the intensity of political competition at the regional level. Legislative and executive actors contest within the same momentum, with overlapping political interests. This situation opens opportunities for money politics and more complex political transactions (Insiyah, S., Nugraha & Damadiyah, 2019).

The mobilization of civil servants constitutes another potential vulnerability within an integrated electoral design. Simultaneous contests encourage political actors to exploit bureaucratic resources for electoral purposes. Transactional coalitions between legislative candidates and regional head candidates may also form more

intensively. This condition expands the spectrum of electoral violations that must be strictly monitored (Saleh & Hadi, 2020).

Experiences from the 2019 and 2024 national simultaneous elections provide empirical insight into the consequences of concurrent elections. High administrative burdens have been a major issue in election administration. Fatigue among ad hoc election workers, vote tabulation errors, and increased potential for violations have become important notes in evaluating the simultaneous election system. Election oversight under such conditions faces significant challenges (Su, Thesti & Sanjaya, 2024).

The normative objective of Constitutional Court Decision Number 135/PUU-XXII/2024 is directed toward simplifying the electoral system and strengthening regional governance. Empirical realities in the field, however, indicate the potential for increased complexity in election administration. This complexity is reflected in the rising workload of election organizers and election supervisors at the regional level. This situation requires more adaptive and responsive institutional capacity (Ridwansyah, Zakyyah & Abidin, 2025).

The General Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu) occupies a strategic position in safeguarding electoral integrity. Its oversight mandate includes prevention and enforcement against violations, including election crimes. This role demands institutional readiness based not only on regulations but also on effective oversight strategies. Oversight effectiveness is an important indicator of the quality of electoral democracy (Muhammad, Nur & Agit, 2023).

The completeness of electoral regulations does not necessarily correspond to effective oversight implementation. Factors such as human resource capacity, institutional support, and coordination patterns across supervisory structures determine oversight success. The ability to adapt to changes in electoral design constitutes a distinct challenge for Bawaslu at the regional level. Oversight strategies must be adjusted to political dynamics and local characteristics (Onyango, 2020).

A preventive approach plays an essential role in election oversight. Enforcement conducted after violations occur often cannot fully restore the resulting impacts. Systematic and well-planned prevention enables violations to be reduced from the earliest electoral stages. Preventive oversight strategies therefore represent a necessity that cannot be ignored.

Maros Regency faces direct impacts from the electoral design changes following Constitutional Court Decision Number 135/PUU-XXII/2024. The integration of regional legislative elections with regional head elections expands the objects and subjects of oversight. The number of political actors under supervision increases significantly within a single electoral cycle. The workload of Bawaslu Maros Regency has increased both quantitatively and qualitatively.

The spectrum of potential electoral violations in Maros Regency has become broader. Money politics, manipulation of electoral administration, and the involvement of civil servants remain recurring issues. Conflicts of interest between legislative candidates and regional head candidates within coalitions further intensify oversight complexity. This condition demands oversight strategies that are more integrated and responsive.

Denser electoral stages narrow the available time for oversight. The scope of oversight expands within a relatively short duration. The risk of election crimes increases alongside high-intensity political competition. Pressure on election supervisory structures at the district, village, and polling station levels becomes increasingly severe (Butt & Siregar, 2021).

Coordination among election supervisory units becomes crucial in this context. District Election Supervisory Committees, Village/Subdistrict Election Supervisors, and Polling Station Supervisors are required to work simultaneously and synergistically. Electoral vulnerabilities are dispersed across multiple points at the same time. Managerial preparedness and coordination systems determine oversight effectiveness.

Maros Regency represents complex local electoral dynamics. Preliminary observations indicate that various forms of electoral violations continue to occur. Money politics, abuse of office, and manipulation of electoral administration remain recurring phenomena. These conditions suggest that election oversight has not yet operated optimally.

Violations within election criminal law not only harm election participants. Citizens' constitutional rights to a fair and honest democratic process are also undermined. Electoral democracy loses legitimacy when violations are allowed to recur without effective prevention. Prevention thus becomes the primary instrument for safeguarding electoral integrity (Lubis, *et al*, 2023).

Election oversight practices indicate a dominance of repressive approaches over preventive ones. Enforcement is more frequently carried out after violations occur. Voter education, regulatory socialization, and institutional strengthening of supervisory bodies have not become primary focuses. The imbalance between legal norms and practical implementation contributes to recurring violations.

These conditions underscore the urgency of research on the effectiveness of election oversight by Bawaslu Maros Regency in addressing election crimes. This research is directed toward evaluating the oversight strategies that have been implemented. New challenges following electoral design changes constitute the central focus of the study. The institutional readiness of Bawaslu in confronting the complexity of electoral violations also becomes a key concern.

The research contribution is expected to be not only descriptive but also analytical and prescriptive. Research findings are expected to provide a theoretical

contribution to the development of electoral law scholarship. Practical recommendations for strengthening election oversight systems at the regional level are also a primary objective. Such efforts are expected to promote elections characterized by integrity and justice.

## METHOD

This study employs non-doctrinal (empirical) legal research using a socio-legal study approach, aimed at gaining an in-depth understanding of the effectiveness and electoral oversight strategies implemented by the Maros Regency Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu) in addressing election crimes. This approach is chosen because the research does not merely examine legal norms textually, but also analyzes how law operates in practice through the behavior and performance of election supervisory institutions. The research was conducted at the Office of Bawaslu Maros Regency, located at Jl. DR. Ratulangi No. 75, Maros Baru District, considering that Maros Regency exhibits relatively complex local political dynamics, a significant level of voter participation, and a high potential for electoral violations requiring intensive oversight, making it a relevant locus for an empirical study of election oversight strategies.

The types of data used in this study consist of primary data and secondary data. Primary data were obtained through in-depth interviews with informants selected using purposive sampling, comprising officials of Bawaslu Maros Regency, District Election Supervisory Committees (Panwascam), and Polling Station Supervisors (TPS Supervisors), totaling 30 informants who were directly involved in the election oversight process. Secondary data were collected through library research on relevant laws and regulations, scholarly literature, and institutional documents related to the research topic. Data collection techniques included field research and documentary study, while data analysis was conducted using descriptive qualitative analysis by systematically interpreting field findings to assess the effectiveness of Bawaslu's oversight strategies in preventing and addressing election crimes.

## RESULT AND DISCUSSION

### A. Supervisory Strategies of Bawaslu Maros Regency in Addressing Electoral Crimes

The supervision of electoral crimes in Maros Regency is implemented through a strategic framework that integrates prevention, stage-based embedded supervision, and early enforcement measures. This strategy is designed to suppress violations from the outset and to ensure that every finding can be processed in accordance with applicable procedures. Interview results show that field supervision is organized through a tiered system, ranging from the regency-level Bawaslu to supervisors at polling stations (TPS). The core focus of this strategy lies in strengthening preventive supervision, followed by rapid case handling through the Gakkumdu mechanism.

Preventive outreach and socialization serve as the primary instrument, positioning education as the entry point for changing the behavior of voters and election participants. Bawaslu Maros Regency involves political parties, campaign teams, village government officials, community leaders, and voters to broaden the reach of prevention messages. The Commissioner of the Violation Prevention Division emphasized that outreach is conducted through formal meetings, the installation of banners, and the dissemination of digital information, with particular emphasis on prohibitions against vote buying and campaigning outside the official schedule (Interview with S. Mahmuddin Assaqqaf). This indicates that outreach is framed as a substantive strategy rather than merely a ceremonial activity.

Socialization methods in Maros are developed through a multi-channel approach to reach community groups with different levels of access to information. Face-to-face engagement is combined with social media and local media to strengthen the penetration of prevention messages. The Commissioner noted that a mix of direct communication and digital approaches is necessary due to differences in public access to information (Interview with S. Mahmuddin Assaqqaf). This strategy reflects Bawaslu's adaptation to a political communication ecosystem that is increasingly digital.

Target segmentation in outreach is carried out to ensure that materials are more effective and aligned with the needs of recipients. First-time voters receive materials emphasizing voter education and awareness of political rights. Election participants and campaign teams receive materials emphasizing campaign boundaries and key prohibitions. Vulnerable groups are also targeted to ensure that prevention efforts reach citizens who may be exposed to political pressure.

The involvement of Panwascam and Village/Subdistrict Supervisors serves as a strategy to expand outreach to villages and subdistricts. Prevention messages are prioritized in areas considered to have higher vulnerability. Coordination between the regency-level Bawaslu and Panwascam is viewed as decisive for outreach effectiveness, because Panwascam functions as the operational extension of education efforts in the field. This pattern confirms that prevention is understood as a decentralized but directed organizational effort.

A major obstacle to outreach stems from the low interest of some community members in attending activities that are not mass-oriented. The Head of Panwascam Bantimurung noted that some residents still regard vote buying as a common practice in elections (Interview with Agus). Such normalization of violations indicates a political culture problem that cannot be resolved through a single outreach effort. The need for sustained educational approaches becomes a logical consequence of these findings.

The use of social media is considered to have a significant impact on disseminating prevention messages, particularly among younger groups. Visual content and short videos are developed to enhance reach and public understanding. This strategy reflects a shift in supervisory work that no longer relies solely on face-to-face engagement. Its effectiveness depends on creativity in communication and the consistent production of prevention messages.

Mapping vulnerability areas serves as a strategic foundation for setting supervision priorities and allocating resources. The mapping is carried out by compiling historical election data, previous supervision reports, recapitulations of violation types, and input from Panwascam and Village/Subdistrict Supervisors. Vulnerable areas are identified using indicators such as a history of vote buying, intense candidate competition, a high number of first-time voters, and social diversity that may trigger conflict. The mapping results are used as the basis for increasing patrols and intensifying supervision.

Vulnerability indicators used by Bawaslu include civil servant (ASN) neutrality, vulnerabilities in the voter list, logistical vulnerabilities, potential horizontal conflict, and potential bias among lower-level election organizers. Districts such as Turikale, Mandai, and Maros Baru are often categorized as having medium to high vulnerability due to their history of violations and campaign intensity. Risk classification is carried out on a low, medium, and high scale as a working reference for Panwascam. This indicator structure demonstrates Bawaslu's effort to shift supervision from reactive practices to a risk-based approach.

Human resource limitations constitute a significant constraint in vulnerability mapping, particularly at the polling station level. Bawaslu's human resources staff stated that the competence of polling station supervisors is not evenly distributed in identifying early indications of violations (Interview with Mustafa). This capacity gap may prevent the mapping from fully capturing micro-level dynamics in the field. Consequently, training and competency strengthening for polling station supervisors become unavoidable needs.

Updating vulnerability data is essential because local political dynamics tend to change rapidly. A one-time mapping risks losing relevance as patterns of contestation, actors, and campaign strategies evolve. Regular situational assessment is necessary to ensure that supervision remains accurate. The ability to detect changing vulnerability patterns determines the effectiveness of preventive measures and rapid response.

Supervisory patrols serve as an active strategy at the district level to prevent violations through the direct presence of supervisors. Panwascam explained that patrols are conducted periodically and are guided by vulnerability mapping, with higher intensity in vulnerable areas. Patrols focus on the campaign period, the cooling-

off period, logistics distribution, and voting and vote counting. This approach underscores field supervision as a tangible mechanism of social control.

Patrol activities are conducted by Panwascam together with Village/Subdistrict Supervisors, monitoring covert campaigning, vote buying, campaign material (APK) violations, mass mobilization, and potential non-neutrality among officials. Direct warnings are often issued as preventive measures when potentially violative activities are detected. Logistics supervision is also part of patrol operations to ensure the timeliness, quality, and security of distribution. Previous experiences of logistical delays or damage provide the rationale for prioritizing logistics patrols in certain areas.

Patrol constraints include limited personnel relative to the size of the area, high mobility of campaign teams, and low public awareness. Panwascam Bantimurung staff noted that human resources are limited while patrol coverage is broad (Interview with Hamzah Has). This situation highlights the tension between workload and institutional capacity at the district level. Coordination support from the police, subdistrict government, and community elements helps sustain patrol effectiveness.

Campaign and cooling-off period patrols are often conducted at night because many violations occur during these hours. Panwascam Turikale noted that night patrols extending into the early morning are important because vote buying frequently takes place at night (Interview with Yusril). Patrols involve Panwascam, PKD, polling station supervisors, and occasionally local police. Patrol effectiveness is reflected in the reduction of overt violations, while covert vote-buying practices remain a continuing challenge.

Supervision of campaign stages is understood as the most crucial phase because most potential violations emerge during this period. Panwascam monitors face-to-face campaigns, campaign material installation, limited meetings, and online campaigns. Official campaign activity reports are verified by matching the stated location, time, and person in charge with actual activities observed in the field. Suspected violations are recorded through Form A by PKD and forwarded to Panwascam (Interview with Sainul).

Objects of campaign supervision include limits on participants, campaign locations, the use of government facilities, prohibitions against involving children, and the prevention of vote buying and hate speech. Campaign material violations frequently occur through placement in houses of worship, educational facilities, and prohibited public spaces. Inventories of campaign material violations are compiled together with PKD, followed by warnings and corrective recommendations to campaign teams. The difficulty of monitoring closed campaigns and the limited number of public reports constitute structural obstacles to campaign supervision.

At the regency level, Bawaslu plays a strategic role through supervision, coordination, and capacity strengthening for Panwascam as the frontline of

supervision. The Chair of Bawaslu Maros Regency emphasized that supervision is not limited to large-scale events, but also includes strengthening Panwascam performance (Interview with Sufirman). Supervisor assignments are arranged based on vulnerability mapping to ensure that simultaneous campaign activities remain monitored. The regency-level supervision focus includes ASN neutrality, vote buying, black campaigns on social media, and the use of government facilities.

The cooling-off period is considered the most vulnerable stage, prompting intensified supervision through day and night patrols and social media monitoring. Panwascam Cenrana stated that patrols are conducted 2–3 times a day and continue at night until 02:00–03:00 (Interview with Amar). The Commissioner of the Violation Handling Division emphasized that instructions were issued to Panwascam in 14 districts to intensify monitoring, especially in areas with high political competition (Interview with M. Gazali Hadis). Key challenges during the cooling-off period include covert vote-buying practices, volunteers without attributes, and increasing digital hoaxes approaching election day.

Election day represents the peak of supervision because it determines the legitimacy of election results. Layered supervision is conducted from polling station preparation, opening procedures, voting, vote counting, to the handover of results by KPPS. Polling station supervisors recorded findings such as voters without identification, voter interference, covert campaigning in the morning, and double voting or voting by out-of-area individuals. Social and political pressure at polling stations also emerges through partisan behavior and the use of electoral attributes within polling station areas.

A specific finding in Tompobulu District concerns the issue of identical voter names in the voter list (DPT), which may cause identification errors. The Head of Panwascam Tompobulu explained that polling station supervisors requested the invitation letter (Form C) distributed by KPPS to ensure that eligible voters could exercise their voting rights (Interview with Rusman). Identity verification and voter validation are considered important to prevent multiple voting. Technical constraints also include differing interpretations among KPPS personnel, difficult-to-access polling station locations, and voter surges that create long queues.

Early enforcement is carried out through formal and substantive examinations of reports or findings before being discussed in the Gakkumdu Center. This mechanism involves Bawaslu, the police, and the prosecution service to accelerate the handling of alleged electoral crimes. Reports that do not meet criminal elements are redirected as administrative or ethical violations. Findings from Bawaslu staff indicate that many vote-buying reports are dismissed at the initial stage due to insufficient evidence, making proof a major obstacle in the enforcement of electoral crimes.

The use of supervisory technology accelerates reporting channels and documentation of violations in the field. WhatsApp Groups are used as rapid reporting channels, while photos and videos serve as preliminary evidence. Supervisory applications such as Siwaslu or SiPelanggar support more systematic recapitulation and mapping of violations. The primary challenge remains the strict evidentiary standards for electoral crimes, which cannot always be met solely through digital evidence.

Overall, the findings show that Bawaslu Maros Regency's supervisory strategy is built through a combination of prevention, stage-based supervision, risk-based patrols, and enforcement through Gakkumdu. The strategy's effectiveness is reflected in reducing overt violations, strengthening tiered supervision coordination, and improving rapid responses to reports. However, limited human resources, a permissive culture toward vote buying, and evidentiary challenges remain significant factors that hinder optimal efforts to address electoral crimes. Continuous improvement is required through capacity strengthening for supervisors, innovation in preventive communication, enhanced evidentiary mechanisms, and stronger public participation support.

## **B. Factors Influencing the Enforcement of Electoral Crimes in Maros Regency**

The enforcement of electoral crime laws in Maros Regency is influenced by structural, technical, and cultural factors. Interview findings indicate that obstacles arise not only at the enforcement stage, but also from the earliest phases of reporting and evidence collection. The local social environment also shapes the willingness of reporters, witnesses, and supervisors to disclose violations. This complexity produces an enforcement reality that does not always align with the normative legal design that has been established.

The quality of preliminary evidence is the most dominant factor in determining whether a report can be processed as an electoral crime. Many reports submitted to Bawaslu are not supported by sufficiently strong evidence to be followed up. This weakness is reflected in dark video footage, photographs that do not clearly show the perpetrator, and incidents that occur very quickly. These conditions make factual verification difficult to carry out convincingly.

The Commissioner of the Violation Handling Division emphasized that most reports often consist only of oral information without supporting documentation or direct witnesses. Vote-buying reports, for example, are frequently alleged, but reporters often fail to provide evidence that meets initial standards. This indicates that evidentiary standards for electoral crimes require strong proof from the very first stage. The Commissioner noted that strict evidentiary requirements make it difficult for reports without solid preliminary evidence to be advanced to deliberation within the

Integrated Law Enforcement Center (Sentra Gakkumdu) (Interview with M. Gazali Hadis).

Delayed reporting further aggravates the weakness of preliminary evidence. Many reporters submit information several hours or even a day after the incident. Traces of the event, the scene, witnesses, and perpetrators often can no longer be verified when supervisors arrive in the field. The Chair of Bawaslu stated that late reports make findings difficult to prove and cannot be escalated if the preliminary evidence does not meet the required threshold (Interview with Sufirman).

The handling of electoral crime reports within Gakkumdu proceeds in stages and largely determines the fate of a case. The first discussion focuses on formal completeness and an initial assessment of the reported incident. The second discussion involves deeper examination of facts, evidence, and the fulfillment of criminal elements by Bawaslu, the police, and the prosecution service. A third discussion can only take place if the criminal elements and evidence are considered adequate.

In practice, many reports stop at the second discussion. The reasons relate to incomplete fulfillment of criminal elements and evidence that remains insufficiently strong. Differences in legal interpretation among Gakkumdu elements may also hinder escalation. Tight handling deadlines further limit the space for deeper investigation of a reported incident.

The willingness of reporters and witnesses to come forward is a crucial issue in proving electoral crimes. People often fear providing testimony due to concerns about social pressure or conflict with certain parties. The Head of Panwascam Mandai explained that witnesses may exist but are sometimes unwilling to provide complete identification, causing the report to fail formal requirements for submission to Gakkumdu (Interview with the Head of Panwascam Mandai). This situation weakens a report's evidentiary force at the initial stage.

Polling station supervisors (Pengawas TPS) often face a dilemma when violations occur outside the polling station area. Vote-buying generally happens covertly and is difficult to document. TPS supervisors must remain stationed at the polling site and therefore cannot freely trace incidents beyond their assigned point. This limited mobility makes it difficult for violations to be recorded directly.

Political pressure and strong local social ties also affect the effectiveness of electoral law enforcement. Community structures characterized by family closeness, friendships, and communal bonds place lower-level supervisors in uncomfortable situations. A Commissioner stated that supervisors often face difficulties when the violator is a relative or a respected local figure (Interview with M. Gazali Hadis). This social context creates a risk of horizontal conflict and encourages supervisors to act more cautiously.

Informal intervention may appear when follow-up processes proceed at the district or village level. Panwascam noted the presence of subtle pressure or appeals to maintain good relationships. Such pressure does not always take the form of threats, but it can still influence a supervisor's willingness to escalate a report. Documentation and reporting processes may be delayed because supervisors consider the potential social impacts within their communities.

TPS supervisors experience social tension because they live in the same environment as voters and campaign teams. Concerns about damaging social relations arise when supervisors report violations. One TPS supervisor stated that reporting can create tension because they operate within the same community (Interview with a TPS Supervisor). This condition can generate a "see but remain silent" phenomenon among some field supervisors.

Limited personnel constitutes a structural factor that weakens the effectiveness of supervision and law enforcement. Maros' wide geographic coverage—with many villages/subdistricts and polling stations—is not proportional to the number of supervisors available. A Commissioner emphasized that ideal personnel needs for monitoring, evidence collection, and rapid response have not been met (Interview with S. Mahmuddin Assaqqaf). This limitation makes simultaneous supervision across multiple points difficult.

The limited structure of Panwascam further increases the workload at the district level. Each district has only three commissioners and several secretariat staff who must oversee election activities across broad areas. Panwascam Mallawa staff explained that incoming reports from multiple points force them to set priorities because they cannot monitor everything at the same time (Interview with Amar). Task distribution is also constrained by rules governing authority between commissioners and staff.

TPS supervisors work alone at their respective polling stations, making the reach of supervision very limited. Violations occurring around the polling station are difficult to trace because supervisors are not allowed to leave the site. One TPS supervisor emphasized that vote-buying reports near polling stations cannot always be checked directly because their duties require them to remain at the TPS (Interview with Abdullah). The impacts include delayed verification, weak documentation, and minimal evidence collection.

Low public legal understanding affects the quality of reporting and participation in supervision. Some community members do not understand categories of electoral violations, particularly criminal violations. The distribution of money or basic goods is still perceived as a normal political practice. This perception causes violations not to be viewed as incidents that must be reported.

Public reports often fail to meet formal and substantive requirements due to limited legal literacy. Reporters' identities are unclear, incident descriptions are not

detailed, evidence is unavailable, or reports are submitted after the incident has passed. Panwascam emphasized that people often consider violations as ordinary matters and thus do not feel the need to report them (Interview with Sainul). This condition strengthens a cycle of violations that is difficult to break.

Lack of awareness regarding evidentiary standards affects the public's readiness to collect preliminary evidence. People often do not realize that photo and video evidence, as well as witness statements, must meet certain quality thresholds. The willingness to act as a witness is also influenced by limited knowledge of legal protections. As a result, lower-level supervisors must provide legal education despite limited time and personnel.

Limited budgets and operational facilities constitute obstacles that reduce mobility and rapid response capacity. Supervising electoral crimes requires intensive patrols, field tracing, documentation, and fast inter-agency coordination. Limited operational budgets mean routine patrols—especially during vulnerable night hours and the cooling-off period—cannot always be carried out optimally. Supervision effectiveness depends heavily on adequate logistical support.

Operational facilities at the Panwascam and TPS supervisor levels are not fully sufficient for evidence-based supervision. Official vehicles are limited, documentation equipment is lacking, and internet connectivity is unstable in several districts. Panwascam and TPS supervisors often rely on personal devices to take photos, record videos, and transmit reports. These limitations affect evidence quality, response speed, and early-tracing accuracy.

Limited advanced training further weakens supervisors' preparedness in dealing with increasingly adaptive violation patterns. Capacity among village and TPS-level supervisors is not evenly distributed in identifying the elements of electoral crimes. Competency gaps affect the quality of Form A reports, the accuracy of violation categorization, and the completeness of preliminary evidence. Capacity strengthening remains a relevant need to improve electoral law enforcement performance.

The interrelationship among these factors shows that obstacles to electoral crime law enforcement in Maros are interconnected. Weak preliminary evidence is influenced by low legal literacy and social pressure that discourages witnesses from coming forward. Limited personnel and budgets weaken patrols, rapid verification, and evidence collection capacity. This combination explains why many reports stop at early stages and do not proceed to prosecution.

Conditions in Maros Regency demonstrate that the enforcement of electoral criminal law cannot rely solely on the normative framework. Improvement requires strengthening an oversight ecosystem that includes public legal literacy, witness protection, and operational support for supervisors. Strengthening supervisor capacity and providing documentation facilities will directly improve the quality of preliminary

evidence. Socio-political consolidation at the local level is also necessary so that supervision is not hindered by close social relations and informal pressures.

## CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

The supervisory strategy implemented by the Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu) of Maros Regency in addressing electoral crimes is carried out through a preventive approach, stage-based supervision, risk-based patrols, and early enforcement through the Integrated Law Enforcement Center (Sentra Gakkumdu), coordinated hierarchically down to the polling station (TPS) level. This strategy has been relatively effective in suppressing overt violations and strengthening supervisory coordination; however, it remains constrained by limited resources, a permissive culture toward vote-buying, and weak preliminary evidence and criminal proof. At the same time, the enforcement of electoral crime laws in Maros Regency is influenced by interrelated structural, technical, and cultural factors, particularly weak preliminary evidence, delayed reporting, socio-political pressure, limited resources, and low public legal literacy, which cause many reports to fail to proceed to the prosecution stage. These conditions demonstrate that effective and sustainable electoral law enforcement requires strengthening institutional and supervisory capacity, enhancing public legal literacy, providing greater protection for supervisors and witnesses, optimizing operational and technological support, and reinforcing sustained public participation in election oversight.

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